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Tackling multiplicity of equilibria with Gröbner bases
Abstract
Multiplicity of equilibria is a prevalent problem in many economic models. Often equilibria are
characterized as solutions to a system of polynomial equations. This paper gives an introduction to the
application of GrÄobner basis methods for ¯nding all solutions of a polynomial system. The Shape
Lemma, a key result from algebraic geometry, states under mild assumptions that a given equilibrium
system has the same solution set as a much simpler triangular system. Essentially the computation of all
solutions then reduces to ¯nding all roots of a single polynomial in a single unknown. The software
package Singular computes the equivalent simple system. If all coeficients in the original equilibrium
equations are rational numbers or parameters then the GrÄobner basis computations of Singular are
exact. This fact implies that the GrÄobner basis methods cannot only be used for a numerical
approximation of equilibria but in fact may allow the proof of theoretical results for the underlying
economic model. Three economic applications illustrate that without much prior knowledge of algebraic
geometry GrÄobner basis methods can be easily applied to gain interesting insights into many modern
economic models.
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Abstract
Multiplicity of equilibria is a prevalent problem in many economic models. Often
equilibria are characterized as solutions to a system of polynomial equations. This pa-
per gives an introduction to the application of Gro¨bner basis methods for finding all
solutions of a polynomial system. The Shape Lemma, a key result from algebraic ge-
ometry, states under mild assumptions that a given equilibrium system has the same
solution set as a much simpler triangular system. Essentially the computation of all
solutions then reduces to finding all roots of a single polynomial in a single unknown.
The software package Singular computes the equivalent simple system. If all coef-
ficients in the original equilibrium equations are rational numbers or parameters then
the Gro¨bner basis computations of Singular are exact. This fact implies that the
Gro¨bner basis methods cannot only be used for a numerical approximation of equilibria
but in fact may allow the proof of theoretical results for the underlying economic model.
Three economic applications illustrate that without much prior knowledge of algebraic
geometry Gro¨bner basis methods can be easily applied to gain interesting insights into
many modern economic models.
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1 Introduction
Multiplicity of equilibria is a prevalent problem in economics, both in equilibrium models
with strategic interactions and in competitive models. While this problem has long been
acknowledged in the theoretical literature it has in the past often been ignored in applied
work. But finally there appears now also to be a growing interest in equilibrium multiplicity
in active areas of modern applied economic analysis. For example, Bodenstein (2008) points
out that multiple steady states arise for reasonable parameter values in a standard model
of the international business cycle literature. Similarly, Besanko et al. (2007) show that
multiple Markov perfect equilibria can easily arise in a stochastic game model of industry
dynamics. This model is an example of a large class of models that has become very
popular in industrial organization and marketing. And in many other applications we may
often suspect that there could be multiple equilibria. But standard numerical methods only
search for a single equilibrium. There is clearly a need in economics for methods that can
find all equilibria for applied models.
In many economic models equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equa-
tions (which may also have satisfy some additional inequalities). Recent advances in the
mathematical field of computational algebraic geometry have led to several powerful meth-
ods and their easy-to-use computer implementations that find all solutions to polynomial
systems. Two different solution approaches stand out, all-solution homotopy methods and
Gro¨bner basis methods. For reasons we describe below we focus on Gro¨bner basis methods
in this paper. We provide a fairly non-technical introduction to these methods and to the
computer algebra system Singular, which as of the writing of this paper is considered
the best freely available software (at www.singular.uni-kl.de) for computing Gro¨bner bases.
Three economic applications illustrate that without much prior knowledge of algebraic ge-
ometry Gro¨bner basis methods can be easily applied to gain interesting insights into many
modern economic models.
The basic idea of the Gro¨bner basis methods for solving polynomial systems of equations
is as follows. The Shape Lemma, a key result from algebraic geometry, states under mild
assumptions that a given equilibrium system has the same solution set as a much simpler
triangular system. Essentially the computation of all solutions then reduces to finding all
roots of a single polynomial in a single unknown. The software package Singular computes
the equivalent simple system. If all coefficients in the original equilibrium equations are
rational numbers or parameters then the computations of Singular are exact. This fact
implies that the Gro¨bner basis methods cannot only be used for a numerical approximation
of equilibria but in fact may allow the proof of theoretical results for the underlying economic
model.
Homotopy continuation methods provide an alternative method for finding all solutions.
The basic idea is to start at a generic polynomial system g(x) whose number of roots is at
least as large as the maximal number of solutions to f(x) = 0 and whose roots are all known.
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Then one needs to trace out all paths (in complex space) of the homotopy H(x, t) = tg(x)+
(1− t)f(x) starting at each solution for t = 0. All solutions to f(x) = 0 can be found in this
manner, see Sturmfels (2002) and Sommese and Wampler (2005). The software package
PHCpack (available free of charge at http://www.math.uic.edu/˜jan/) provides a fast and
robust implementation of an all-solution homotopy method among its many features. The
solver can be used as a black-box, entering the system of polynomial equations in a file.
Homotopy methods can usually solve larger systems, with more unknowns and polynomials
of higher degrees, than Gro¨bner basis methods. But Gro¨bner basis methods have the
following important advantages.
1. Homotopy methods are purely numerical methods. Due to rounding errors it is some-
times difficult to determine whether a homotopy path has indeed converged or whether
the final numerical solution is real or complex. On the contrary, Gro¨bner basis meth-
ods offer the possibility of exact calculations without any rounding errors. Therefore,
such a method may allow us to prove the existence of a unique equilibrium.
2. We can calculate Gro¨bner bases for parameterized polynomials. This fact implies that
we can establish bounds on the number of equilibria for entire classes of economic
models.
3. Parameterized Gro¨bner bases enable us to search for specific parameter values for
which there are multiple equilibria or to prove that equilibria are unique for all pa-
rameter values in a given set.
We illustrate these points with three economic examples. While these are small examples
which are chosen to illustrate the advantages of Gro¨bner bases we feel that they also provide
some interesting economic insights. Hopefully they serve as a motivation for the reader to
apply the methods presented in this paper to other and larger models.
We first consider a game under incomplete information with cheap talk (the arms race
game of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004)) and show how multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in such a game can be addressed with Gro¨bner bases. Agents’ types are i.i.d. with
a cumulative distribution function F . Under the assumption that F is polynomial, the
solutions of a system of polynomial equations constitute cut-off values in type space which
in turn determine the cheap-talk message agents send in equilibrium. We compute the
Gro¨bner basis for the polynomials appearing in the equations and then compute all solu-
tions. We show how the two equilibria in the game change as some key parameter in the
model changes.
Secondly we consider a strategic market game (a variation of Shapley and Shubik (1977))
with a large but finite number of players and show how all competitive equilibria in the
underlying economy are approximated by all Nash equilibria of the game as the number
of agents becomes large. In our example there are two types of agents with heterogeneous
CES utility and heterogeneous endowments and finitely many identical individuals within
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in each type. If the total number of players is small there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
We show how the number of Nash equilibria increases as the number of players goes up
and how finally all Nash equilibria approximate the three competitive equilibria of the
economy. While there is a large theoretical literature on strategic market games and the
convergence of Nash equilibria to competitive equilibria in these games (see e.g. Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1978)), little work has been done on the computation of all equilibria
in these games. Our example illustrates that interesting insights can be obtained from
relatively simple computations in these games.
Finally we give an example of multiplicity of steady states in a general equilibrium
model with overlapping generations and individuals that live for more than two periods.
For a class of models, we show that there can never be more than three steady states
and give examples of models where this bound is actually attained. Models of overlapping
generations are routinely used in applied policy analysis (see e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987)). The multiplicity of steady states in these models potentially casts doubts on the
validity of this analysis. Our analysis illustrates that examples of multiplicity can easily be
constructed in standard models but that it is also true that steady states are unique for a
large range of parameter values.
There is, of course, a growing literature on the computation of all equilibria in normal
form games, see Dutta (2007) for an excellent recent survey and also Sturmfels (2002). In
this paper, we do not address this problem because we consider it somewhat less important
in applied economic modeling.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a simple non-technical intro-
duction to Gro¨bner bases. Section 3 describes how to use Singular to compute Gro¨bner
bases and all solutions to polynomial equations. In Sections 4 – 6 we provide examples of
simple but interesting economic applications. The Appendix provides more formal results
on Gro¨bner bases.
2 Some Background on Polynomials and Gro¨bner Bases
In this section we summarize some basic definitions and concepts from the field of algebraic
geometry that are fundamental to our analysis in this paper. We refer the interested reader
to the textbooks by Cox et al. (1997, 1998). The treatment in this section is deliberately
simple. In the Appendix we provide a more detailed and formal description of the main
concepts.
2.1 Polynomials
For the description of a polynomial f in the n variables x1, x2, . . . , xn we first need to define
monomials. A monomial in x1, x2, . . . , xn is a product xα11 · xα22 . . . xαnn where all exponents
αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are nonnegative integers. It will be convenient to write a monomial as
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xα ≡ xα11 ·xα22 . . . xαnn with α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Zn+, the set of nonnegative integer vectors
of dimension n. A polynomial is a linear combination of finitely many monomials with
coefficients in a field K. In this paper we not need to consider arbitrary fields of coefficients
but instead we can focus on three commonly used fields. These are the field of rational
numbers Q, the field of real numbers R, and the field of complex numbers C. Polynomials
over the field of rational numbers are computationally convenient since modern computer
algebra systems (such as Singular which is described below) perform exact computations
over the field Q. Economic parameters are typically real numbers and thus force us to
consider R[x].
We can write a polynomial f as
f(x) =
∑
α∈S
aαx
α, aα ∈ K, S ⊂ Zn+ finite.
We denote the collection of all polynomials in the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn with coefficients in
the field K by K[x1, . . . , xn], or, when the dimension is clear from the context, by K[x]. The
set K[x] is called ‘a polynomial ring’ (it satisfies the properties of a so-called commutative
ring but this is irrelevant for our purposes).
We are interested in the set of real solutions to a system of polynomial equations, that
is, given f1, . . . , fk ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] we want to find all elements in (the hopefully finite) set
{x ∈ Rn : f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0}.
The study of solution sets of polynomial equations requires the variables x to range over
an algebraically closed field. Unlike the fields Q and R the field of complex numbers C is
algebraically closed. Therefore, our objective is to find all elements in the set
V = {x ∈ Cn : f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0}.
This solution set is called the complex variety defined by f1, . . . , fk. The key observation
in finding all solutions is that we can multiply each of the polynomials fi by another non-
zero polynomial and add any polynomials fi and fj without eliminating any of the original
solutions and without introducing additional solutions. It turns out that Gaussian elimina-
tion in linear algebra has a close analogue for polynomial equations. In order to make this
intuition more formal, we need an additional definition. For given polynomials f1, . . . , fk,
the set
I = {
k∑
i=1
hifi : hi ∈ K[x]} = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉,
is called the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fk. The ideal 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 is the set of all linear com-
binations of the polynomials f1, . . . , fk, where the ‘coefficients’ in each linear combination
are themselves polynomials in the polynomial ring K[x]. There two aspects about ideals
that are crucial for our analysis. First note that
{x ∈ Cn : f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0} = {x ∈ Cn : g(x) = 0 for all g ∈ 〈f1, . . . , fk〉}.
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In other words, the set of solutions to a polynomial system of equations is identical to the
set of solutions to all (infinitely many!) polynomials in the ideal generated by the system.
Therefore, we can call the solution set V the complex variety of the ideal 〈f1, . . . , fk〉. Sec-
ondly note that we can find other polynomials, g1, . . . , gr such that 〈g1, . . . , gr〉 = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉
and
{x ∈ Cn : f1(x) = . . . = fk(x) = 0} = {x ∈ Cn : g1(x) = . . . = gr(x) = 0}.
The sets of polynomials g1, . . . , gr and f1, . . . , fk are called bases of the ideal 〈f1, . . . , fk〉.
The idea is then to find a alternative basis for the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fk that is easy
to solve.
Consider the example of two polynomials f1 and f2 in the two unknowns x1 and x2,
f1 = 2x21 + 3x
2
2 − 11 and f2 = x21 − x22 − 3.
What can we say about the set of common roots of these two polynomials? Note that for
any ideal I, simply by definition, if f1, . . . , fk ∈ I, then 〈f1, . . . , fs〉 ⊂ I. Thus, showing
f1, f2 ∈ 〈x2 − 4, y2 − 1〉 and conversely x2 − 4, y2 − 1 ∈ 〈f1, f2〉 proves that 〈f1, f2〉 =
〈x2 − 4, y2 − 1〉. Therefore V (f1, f2) consists of the four points (2, 1), (−2, 1), (2,−1) and
(−2,−1).
Obviously the example is rather simple and we could have solved the problem without
any knowledge of the term ‘ideal.’ However, the solution approach of transforming a given
system of polynomial equations into a simpler system with an identical solution set works
much more generally. Under some mild conditions it is always possible to find an alternative
basis for a polynomial system that can be solved easily. Such a good basis is the Gro¨bner
basis under lexicographic monomial order. So why exactly do we care about Gro¨bner bases?
2.2 The Exact Computation of All Solutions
For the remainder of this paper we restrict ourselves to square systems of polynomial equa-
tions, that is, k = r = n. In a slight abuse of notation, we call an ideal regular if its complex
variety has finitely many complex solutions which are locally unique in the sense that the
Jacobian has full rank at all solutions. That is, if I = 〈f1, . . . , fn〉, we say that I is regular
if f(x) = 0 ⇒ Dxf(x) has full rank n. With this definition we can state the key result for
our analysis in this paper.
Lemma 1 (Shape Lemma) Let I be a regular ideal in Q[x1, . . . , xn] with all d complex roots
of I having distinct xn coordinates. Then the reduced Gro¨bner basis of I in the lexicographic
term order has the shape
G = {x1 − q1(xn), x2 − q2(xn), . . . , xn−1 − qn−1(xn), r(xn)}
where r is a polynomial of degree d and the qi are polynomials with a degree of at most d− 1.
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If the Shape Lemma holds finding all solutions to a polynomial system of equations
reduces to finding all solutions to a single equation, a task for which there exist efficient
numerical methods. The question is therefore whether the assumptions of the lemma,
namely (i) the ideal being regular, and (ii) all roots having distinct xn coordinates, are easy
to verify and likely to hold in economic models.
The first condition typically holds if one only considers real solutions (for example,
generically, competitive and Nash equilibria are locally unique and finite in number). But
it is sometimes difficult to verify that in fact there are only finitely many complex solutions.
An easy way to ensure that all solutions are regular is to add the following additional
polynomial equation to the original system,
1− tdet[Dxf(x)] = 0.
There cannot be a solution in t and x which is not locally unique.
Condition (ii) holds for a wide variety of problems. In case the condition does not hold,
we can always add an additional equation,
y −
n∑
l=1
αlxl = 0.
For generic (α1, . . . , αn) all solutions to f(x) = 0 and y −
∑n
l=1 αlxl = 0 will have distinct
y-coordinates. Hence the Shape Lemma holds for the larger system with y as the last
coordinate.
2.3 Bounding the Number of Zeros
The Shape Lemma implies that the number of real solutions to f1(x) = . . . = fn(x) = 0 is
equal to the number of real roots of the last polynomial r(xn). The Fundamental Theorem of
Algebra, see Sturmfels (2002) states that any univariate polynomial,
∑d
i=0 aiz
i, with ai ∈ R
for all i, has d complex roots (counting multiplicities). There a better bounds available
for the number of real zeros. Define the number of sign changes of r to be the number of
elements of {ai 6= 0, i = 0, . . . , d − 1 : sign(ai) = −sign(ai+1)}. The classical Descartes’s
Rule of Signs, see Sturmfels (2002), states that the number of real positive zeros of r does
not exceed the number of sign changes. This bound is remarkable because it bounds the
number of real zeros. It is possible that a polynomial system is of very high degree and
has many solutions but the Descartes bound on the number of zeros of the representing
polynomial proves that the system has a single real positive solution.
Moreover, if all ai ∈ Q, Sturm’s theorem provides an algorithm to determine the exact
number of real roots of any univariate polynomial in a particular interval (see again Sturm-
fels (2002)). This fact implies that it is possible to say with certainty how many equilibria
there are for a given economic model.
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2.4 A Parametric Shape Lemma
What makes Gro¨bner basis particularly useful is that in fact, one can compute a Gro¨bner
basis for polynomials whose coefficients are parameters. The following lemma generalizes
the Shape Lemma from above and allows us to represent equilibria of parameterized classes
of economic models in the shape form. For the statement of this lemma we extend the
definition of the polynomial ring K[x] with coefficients in the field K to allow for coefficients
that are polynomials in parameters e1, . . . , em. We denote this ring by K[e;x].
Lemma 2 (Parameterized Shape Lemma)
Let E ⊂ Rm, be an open set of parameters, (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Cn a set of variables and let
f1, . . . , fn ∈ K[e1, . . . , em;x1, . . . , xn]. Assume that for each e¯ = (e¯1, . . . , e¯m) ∈ E, the ideal
I(e¯) = 〈f1(e¯; ·), . . . , fn(e¯; ·)〉 is regular and all complex solutions have distinct xn coordinates.
Then there exist r, v1, . . . , vn−1 ∈ K[e; y] and ρ1, . . . , ρn−1 ∈ K[e], not identical equal to zero,
such that for all e¯ ∈ E with ρl(e¯) 6= 0, for all l and with r(e¯, .) no identically equal to zero ,
the following holds.
{x ∈ Cn : f1(e¯, x) = . . . = fn(e¯, x) = 0}
= {x ∈ Cn : ρ1(e¯)x1 = v1(e¯; y), . . . , ρn−1(e¯)xn−1 = vn−1(e¯; y) for r(e¯;xn) = 0}.
We illustrate the lemma with several examples below. Basically, what it says is that one
can treat the coefficients of a polynomial system as parameters and obtain a Gro¨bner basis
where the coefficients of the polynomials in the basis are polynomials in the parameters.
There may be some parameters for which this is not the correct Gro¨bner basis. However,
it suffices to assume that ρl(e¯) 6= 0, for all l and that at e¯ the polynomial r is not identically
equal to zero , together with the fairly strong assumption that I is regular at all e ∈ E.
Since this turns out to be an important but slightly complicated issue, we discuss it more
formally in the Appendix.
The assumption of the lemma that I is regular for all parameters in E is obviously a
very strong assumptions. In economic applications, one can typically show regularity for
‘almost all’ parameter values, i.e. for parameters outside of a closed set of measure zero.
So the naturally the question arises what happens at some e¯ where I is not regular, but
where in any open neighborhood of e¯ there is a regular I. As the following example shows,
one cannot find the solution set V (I) from knowing V (G), even if G is regular. Suppose
as a trivial example I = 〈e(x + y), xy + e〉 ⊂ Q[e;x, y]. A valid Go¨bner basis for almost
all parameters e is given by G = 〈y2 − e, x + z〉. Clearly, for e = 0, this is not the correct
Gro¨bner basis. This fact does not contradict the lemma since I is not regular.
Instead of assuming the regularity of the ideal I we could compute the set of parameter
values for which the Gro¨bner basis may not specialize correctly. Cox et al. (1997, pp. 283
– 284) describe an algorithm for this purpose.
Having a shape representation of the polynomial system in parameters has two advan-
tages. Often one can use Descartes’ method to derive bounds on the number of equilibria
8
uniform over all (or almost all) parameters. Secondly, one can search for parameters for
which the system has ‘a singularity’. At these points the number of solution typically
changes (more precisely, if the number of solutions changes it must be at a singularity).
2.5 Detecting Multiple Solutions
Given a Gro¨bner basis in parameters with univariate representation r(e;xn), a singularity
(of the Gro¨bner basis) occurs at e¯, x¯n if and only if
r(e¯, x¯n) = 0,
∂r(e¯, x¯n)
∂xn
= 0. (1)
Given we start with parameters eˆ for which there exists a unique solution to the system of
equations, (robust) multiplicity can only occur in a convex set E with eˆ ∈ E, if the above
system of equations has a solution in E. Note that at points where a singularity occurs
in the original system, Lemma 2 above no longer holds and we cannot say anything about
how the Gro¨bner basis looks like and if the solution sets coincide. However, in order for
there to be an open set of parameters for which the f -system has multiple solutions (we
refer to this as robust multiplicity), there must be an open set for which the Gro¨bner basis
has multiple solutions. This can only occur if the Gro¨bner system has a singularity. So how
can one detect a singularity in the Gro¨bner basis?
For the case of a single free parameter these are two equations in two unknowns and
the equations typically have finitely many solutions that can be found by computing the
Gro¨bner basis of this new system. In the applications below, we focus on this simple case.
For several parameters, the solution set is infinite (i.e. positive dimensional). Aubry et
al. (2002) develop an algorithm to find representative solutions of the positive dimensional
system.
3 Gro¨bner Basis Computation with Singular
As of the writing of this paper the computer algebra system Singular is considered to
be among the leading if not the best freely available software package for Gro¨bner basis
computations. Decker and Lossen (2006), Greuel and Pfister (2007), and Greuel et al.
(2005) provide detailed descriptions of this software. Singular has many capabilities that
we do not need for our objective of finding all economic equilibria. And so here we provide
only information on the software that is needed for the computation of Gro¨bner bases and
all solutions to square systems of polynomial equations.
Consider the following system of three equations in the three unknowns x, y, z,
x− yz3 − 2z3 + 1 = −x+ yz − 3z + 4 = x+ yz9 = 0 .
The polynomials on the left-hand side of the three equations define a polynomial ideal. As
a first step we compute a Gro¨bner basis for this ideal. We enter the following commands in
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Singular.
ring R=0,(x,y,z),lp;
ideal I=(
x-y*z**3-2*z**3+1,
-x+y*z-3*z+4,
x+y*z**9);
ideal G=groebner(I);
In Singular, we first have to declare a base-ring which we call R in this example. A zero
in the ring declaration indicates that we consider polynomials over the rational numbers.
We highly recommend this declaration since only then the computation is exact. We denote
the unknowns by x, y, z and use ’lp’ to instruct Singular that we use the lexicographic
monomial order for the variables, see the Appendix for background on monomial orderings.
This first command line should only be altered to change the number (or names) of the
variables or to introduce parameters. Next an ideal, here called I, is defined via a list of
the polynomials that form a basis of the ideal. Note that Singular requires the signs
* and ** to indicate the multiplication and power operation, respectively. The command
groebner(I) computes a Gro¨bner basis for I, by first choosing an ’optimal algorithm’ under
several available in Singular and then applying it.
To see the output, we type ‘G;’ at the Singular command line and obtain the following
output.
> G;
G[1]=2z11+3z9-5z8+5z3-4z2-1
G[2]=2y+18z10+25z8-45z7-5z6+5z5-5z4+5z3+40z2-31z-6
G[3]=2x-2z9-5z7+5z6-5z5+5z4-5z3+5z2+1
Contrary to the input format the output of Singular does not use the multiplication
and power signs. For example, 2z11 is to be read as 2 · z11. In this example the Shape
Lemma holds. There are 11 solutions since G[1] is a polynomial of degree 11 in the last
variable z. Note that by Descartes’ bound at most 3 of them can be real and positive. To
solve numerically for all complex solutions, we first need to load a library in Singular.
> LIB ‘‘solve.lib’’;
The following command gives all complex solutions.
> solve(G);
10
Only one of the 11 solutions is real, the other 10 are complex. Singular prints them
all. The unique real solution is (12 ,−12 , 1).
3.1 Parameters
The following variation of the previous example illustrates how to introduce parameters.
Let the coefficient of the monomial x in the last equation be a free parameter, i.e. the last
equation becomes
ex+ yz9 = 0.
In Singular we now need to declare the parameter as part of the ring in the initial com-
mand line. The declaration ‘R=(0,e)’ states that all polynomial coefficients contain only
elements of Q and the parameter e.
ring R=(0,e),(x,y,z),lp;
ideal I=(
x-y*z**3-2*z**3+1,
-x+y*z-3*z+4,
e*x+y*z**9);
ideal G=groebner(I);
G;
G[1]=2z11+3z9-5z8+(5e)*z3+(-4e)*z2+(-e)
G[2]=(-e2-e)*y+(-8e-10)*z10+(-10e-15)*z8+(20e+25)*z7+(5e)*z6+(-5e)*z5
+(5e)*z4+(-5e)*z3+(-20e2-20e)*z2+(16e2+15e)*z+(3e2+3e)
G[3]=(-e-1)*x+2z9+5z7-5z6+5z5-5z4+5z3-5z2-1
Singular produces a Gro¨bner basis for the ideal of parameterized polynomials. Observe
that the univariate representation G[1] is a polynomial of degree 11 for any value of e.
Figure 1 shows the real roots of the univariate representation for e ∈ [−5, 1]. For positive
values of e G[1] has the unique solution z = 1. For non-positive values of e there are
multiple solutions. However, we cannot conclude that as a result the entire system of
equations always has the same number of real solutions. Recall that the parameterized
Shape Lemma holds only for a generic set of parameter values. For fixed values of the
parameter the parameterized Gro¨bner basis may not specialize to the correct basis. Here
this difficulty becomes obvious. Observe that the leading term of G[2] is e(−e − 1)y and
so for e ∈ {−1, 0} the variable y no longer appears. The same is true for the variable x in
G[3] for e = −1. Figures 2 and 3 show the real solutions for G[2] and G[3], respectively,
for e ∈ [−5, 1].
As e→ −1 the values of y and x grow unbounded in two of the three solutions. Only in
one solution their values remain bounded. For e = −1 both variables no longer appear in
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Figure 1: Real solutions for z depending on the parameter e
the Gro¨bner basis. As e↘ 0 the values of y and x remain bounded in all three solutions.
Instead of using the parameterized basis we need to resolve the original system for e = 0
and e = −1. For e = 0 the resulting Gro¨bner basis is as follows.
G[1]=2z3+3z-5
G[2]=y
G[3]=x+3z-4
There is a unique real solution, (1, 0, 1). This indicates that as e ↘ two of the three
solutions do not converge to a solution even though all three solutions remain finite. Only
the solution with z = 1 converges to a solution of the original system at e = 0.
For e = −1 the Gro¨bner basis is as follows.
G[1]=2z9+5z7-5z6+5z5-5z4+5z3-5z2-1
G[2]=33y+320z8+10z7+790z6-765z5+740z4-715z3+690z2-665z-94
G[3]=33x+10z8-10z7+35z6-60z5+85z4-110z3+135z2+5z+28
There is a unique real solution, (−3.37023,−4.63605, 0.965189).
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Figure 2: Solutions for G[2]=0 for real values of z
3.2 Critical Points
If along a path of parameters the number of real solutions changes then there must be a
critical point, that is, system (1) with the parameters and the last variable xn as its un-
knowns must have a solution. For a single parameter this system consists of two equations
in two unknowns. For our example the appropriate Singular code is then as follows.
ring R=0,(e,z),lp;
ideal I=(
2*z**11+3*z**9-5*z**8+5*e*z**3-4*e*z**2-e,
11*2*z**10+9*3*z**8-8*5*z**7+3*5*e*z**2-2*4*e*z);
ideal G=groebner(I);
solve (G);
Observe that we now must declare the parameter e as one of the two variables. This system
has two real solutions, (e, z) = (0, 0) and (e, z) = (−97 , 1). For e = 1 we have seen that
there is a unique solution and so there must be a unique solution for all e > 0. In order for
there to be multiple solutions for any e¯ > 0, there must be a singularity between that e¯ and
e = 1, which is not the case. For all positive parameters the system has a unique solution.
At e = −97 ≈ −1.28571 there is a critical point but the number of solutions is three both
for smaller and larger values of e. At the point there is a multiple solution.
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3.3 Failure of Shape Lemma
The Shape Lemma rests on the two assumptions that the ideal I is regular and that all
solutions have distinct values for the last variable. Here we illustrate with two simple
examples what can happen when the assumptions are not satisfied.
Consider the system of equations
x2 − y = y − 4 = 0.
This system has the two solutions (−2, 4) and (2, 4). If y is the last coordinate then both
solutions have the same value for the last coordinate. No polynomial that is linear in x of
the form x− q(y) can yield two different solutions for x for the same value of y.
It is easy to see (without any computation) that the Gro¨bner basis is as follows.
G[1]=y-4
G[2]=x2-4
The Shape Lemma fails, G[2] is not linear in x. But observe that if we reorder the variables
then the Shape Lemma holds since now x is the last coordinate and both solutions have
different values for x.
Consider the system of equations
x2(x− y) = y2(x+ y − 1) = 0.
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Clearly for x = y = 0 the solutions are not locally unique in our sense. The Shape Lemma
fails and the Gro¨bner basis is as follows.
G[1]=2y5-5y4+4y3-y2
G[2]=xy2+y3-y2
G[3]=x3-x2y
However, it is easy to see that the system has finitely many solutions. To solve for them
we need to compute what is called the ‘radical’ of the system, see the Appendix. After
loading the library ‘solve.lib’ we can also use the command radical and obtain a Gro¨bner
basis with multiple zeros eliminated:
ideal J=groebner(radical(I));
J[1]=2y3-3y2+y
J[2]=x+2y2-2y
The Shape Lemma holds once we compute the radical of the ideal. This approach works
if and only if the all solutions have distinct last coordinate and there are finitely many.
Our notion of regular ideal requires two elements, namely finitely many solutions and full
rank of the Jacobian at all solutions. The latter condition automatically holds if we first
compute the radical of the ideal.
4 Multiple Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
As a first application of the Gro¨bner bases methods we compute equilibria in a game-
theoretic model with cheap talk. Specifically, we compute Bayesian Nash equilibria for
the arms race game of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004), hereafter BS. For this purpose we first
summarize the computationally relevant aspects of the game. For many additional details
and particularly the interpretation of the game we refer the reader to the original paper.
4.1 An Arms Race Game with Cheap Talk
Two players simultaneously and independently choose between building a new weapons
system (B) and not building new weapons (N). If both players choose N then the payoff
to each of them is 0. A player who chooses N while its opponent chooses B suffers a loss
d > 0. A player who chooses B while its opponent chooses N receives a gain of µ > 0.
Player i’s cost of acquiring a new weapons system is ci ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. Player i’s payoffs are
summarized in the following payoff matrix, where player i chooses a row and its opponent
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j a column.
B N
B −ci µ− ci
N −d 0
The cost ci are player i’s private information. We refer to ci as player i’s type. Each
player knows its own type ci but not the other player’s type cj . The types c1 and c2 are
i.i.d. with a continuous cumulative distribution function F . The function F has compact
support [0, c¯] with F (0) = 0, F ′(c) > 0 for 0 < c < c¯, and F (c¯) = 1. Also, c¯ < d. All
parameters and functions are common knowledge with the exception of the types c1 and c2.
For their analysis of the arms race game BS introduce a key assumption, the multiplier
condition for the distribution function F . This condition requires that F (c)d ≥ c for all
c ∈ [0, c¯]. BS show that if the multiplier condition is satisfied, then for any µ > 0 there
is a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium all players choose to build a
new weapons system (action B), regardless of their type. In the language of BS the only
equilibrium outcome in the game is an “arms race.” This outcome in inefficient because all
types prefer (N,N) to the equilibrium (B,B).
After the analysis of the described equilibrium outcome BS introduce cheap talk to their
game. The cheap-talk extension of the arms race game consists of three stages. In stage
zero, nature chooses the types c1 and c2. In stage one, the players simultaneously and
publicly announce messages. Two messages are sent in equilibrium, a conciliatory message
or an aggressive message. These messages do not affect the possible payoffs but they may
convey information about what the players intend to do in the future. Finally, in stage two,
the players simultaneously choose either B or N and receive the corresponding payoff from
their respective payoff matrices. The main theorem of BS states that in this cheap-talk
extension of the game there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which arms races can
be avoided with high probability if µ > 0 is sufficiently small.
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004, Theorem 2) Suppose the multiplier condition is satisfied.
For any δ > 0 there is a µ¯ > 0 such that if 0 < µ < µ¯ then there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the arms race game where N is played with at
least probability 1− δ.
The theorem and the construction of the equilibrium rely crucially on the following
lemma.
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004, Lemma 1) Suppose the multiplier condition is satisfied.
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For sufficiently small µ > 0, there exists a triple (cL, c∗, cH) such that
µ < cL < c∗ < cH < c¯ (2)[
F (cH)− F (cL)] cL = (1− F (cH))µ (3)[
1− 2 (F (cH)− F (cL))] cH = F (cL)d (4)(
1− F (cH)) (µ− c∗) + F (cL)(−c∗) = F (cL)(−d) (5)
If µ→ 0 then cH → 0.
This lemma builds the foundation for the equilibrium announcement made in stage one
and the actions played on the equilibrium path in stage two. A complete description of
the equilibrium is not needed for our analysis. Informally, the following features of the
equilibrium are important. The values cL and cH represent cut-offs in the type space of a
player at which it changes its message in stage one. (At the cut-off c∗ a player is indifferent
between B and N in stage 1 if both players sent a conciliatory message.) Equations (3),
(4), and (5) determine the values cL, cH , and c∗. BS show that in equilibrium, if both
players have a type exceeding cH then they both send a conciliatory message in stage one
and play N in stage two. In the interpretation of BS, contrary to the original game without
cheap-talk, there is now an equilibrium is which an arms race is avoided. And if cH → 0
then the probability of player i having a type ci > cH tends to one, 1 − F (cH) → 1. This
is the key result of the paper.
BS point out that there may be other perfect Bayesian equilibria of the cheap-talk ex-
tension of the arms race game. They mention a second equilibrium with cut-offs (cˆL, cˆ∗, cˆH)
which also satisfy equations (3) – (5). This second equilibrium has the property that
(cˆL, cˆH) → (0, cmed) as µ → 0, where cmed is the median cost given by F (cmed) = 12 .
Thus, in this second equilibrium an arms race can be avoided for small µ only roughly a
quarter of the time. BS make no statements whether there are other equilibria than the
two described ones.
4.2 Polynomial Specification of the Game
Any solution to equations (3) – (5) that also satisfies the inequalities (2) yields an equilib-
rium of the structure described by BS. Clearly we cannot hope to solve these three equations
in three unknowns for general functions F . But if F is a polynomial function on its support
[0, c¯] then the equations (3) – (5) are polynomial equations and we can apply the Gro¨bner
bases methods.
Suppose the distribution of types is uniform on the interval [0, 1] and so F (c) = c for
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c ∈ [0, 1]. Then equations (3) – (5) have the following form.(
cH − cL) cL = (1− cH)µ (6)[
1− 2 (cH − cL)] cH = cLd (7)(
1− cH) (µ− c∗) + cL(−c∗) = cL(−d) (8)
Using the simplified notation m = µ and (c(3), c(2), c(1)) = (cH , c∗, cL) we write the system
in Singular as follows.
int n = 3;
ring R= (0,m,d),(c(3),c(2),c(1)),lp;
option(redSB);
ideal I =(
(c(3)-c(1))*c(1)-(1-c(3))*m,
(1-2*(c(3)-c(1)))*c(3)-c(1)*d,
(1-c(3))*(m-c(2))-c(1)*c(2)+c(1)*d);
ideal G=groebner(I);
Singular produces the following output.
G[1]=(-2*m+d-1)*c(1)**3+(2*m*d+m)*c(1)**2+(m2*d-2*m2-m)*c(1)+(m2)
G[2]=(m+1)*c(2)+(m-d)*c(1)+(-m*d-m)
G[3]=(-2*m2-2*m)*c(3)+(2*m-d+1)*c(1)**2+(-m*d)*c(1)+(2*m2+m)
With c¯ = 1 as the upper bound for the support of the distribution F the assumption
c¯ < d implies d > 1. For sufficiently small m (= µ) the univariate polynomial G[1] then
has two sign changes and so there can be at most two positive real solutions. For fixed
values of d and m we can easily find all zeros of the Gro¨bner basis. Figure 4 displays the
positive real solutions for d = 1.5 and small values of µ. (The third solution has negative
real values for all three variables for µ < 0.25.) There are three curves, one for each cut-off
value cL < c∗ < cH . The respective upper branches of the curves for cL and c∗ together with
the lower branch of the curve for cH represent the equilibrium solution that is emphasized
and deemed desirable by BS. (The three branches are marked with a point at µ = 0.024.)
Note that as in their lemma cH → 0 as µ→ 0. The respective other branches of the three
curves represent the second equilibrium which has the property that cH → 12 as µ→ 0. At
µ = 16
143+19
√
57
≈ 0.0558568 the two respective branches meet for each cut-off value. The
univariate polynomial G[1] has a double solution cL = 0.101588. As µ increases further the
solutions become complex. For example, for µ = 0.0559 the two solutions for cL become
0.101611±0.0023494i. The system (6) – (8) no longer has a positive real solution. Note that
this observation does not violate the lemma of BS since its claim holds only for sufficiently
small µ > 0.
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Figure 4: Equilibria for d = 1.5
We next show that the condition c¯ < d is important. When d = c¯ = 1 the Gro¨bner basis
is sufficiently simple to allow for closed-form expressions in µ for all three solutions of the
system (6) – (8). The solution (cL, c∗, cH) = (1, 1, 1) violates the inequalities (2). Figure 5
displays the remaining two solutions, which are(
1
4
(
1−
√
1− 8µ
)
,
1 + 7µ− (1− µ)√1− 8µ
4(1 + µ)
,
1
2
)
and (
1
4
(
1 +
√
1− 8µ
)
,
1 + 7µ+ (1− µ)√1− 8µ
4(1 + µ)
,
1
2
)
.
For µ > 0.125 both solutions for cL and c∗ are complex. Note that cH = 12 and so as µ→ 0
it holds that cH 6→ 0. Thus the theorem of BS no longer holds for d = c¯ = 1.
This completes our analysis of the cheap-talk game. Note that in the analyzed range
for µ > 0 no coefficient of a leading term in the Gro¨bner basis ever has the value 0. The
parameterized Gro¨bner basis specializes correctly for all analyzed parameter values. But for
µ = 0 the Gro¨bner basis does not specialize since the linear term in c[3] has the coefficient
0 in G[3]. A separate analysis shows that there is a regular solution at (0, 0, 12) and a double
solution at (0, 0, 0).
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5 Multiple Nash Equilibria in Strategic Market Games
Following Shapley and Shubik (1977) strategic market games have become an important tool
to understand the foundations of price formation in markets. Such games provide strategic
underpinnings for the general equilibrium paradigm. A key result (see e.g. Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1978)) in this framework states that as the number of agents becomes large,
prices and allocations in all non-trivial Nash equilibria in the strategic market game approx-
imate Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding general equilibrium model of the economy.
This approximation result naturally leads to further research questions such as the follow-
ing. How many agents are needed in the game for the Nash equilibrium to be a reasonable
approximation of the Walrasian equilibrium? What happens in the presence of multiple
Nash and Walrasian equilibria? Do some Walrasian equilibria get better approximated by
the market game equilibrium than others? Of course, little if anything can be said in general
about these issues but we may hope for answers to these questions for specific economic
models. For such an analysis we need a method to solve for all Nash equilibria in market
games and all Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding general equilibrium model. We now
describe the application of Gro¨bner basis methods to address these issues in the context
of a simple model. We begin with the computation of equilibria in a general equilibrium
model and subsequently compute equilibria for the corresponding market game.
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5.1 Multiple Arrow-Debreu Equilibria
Suppose there are two types of agents and two commodities. Utility functions are
u1(c1, c2) = −642 c
−2
1 −
1
2
c−22 , u
2(c1, c2) = −12c
−2
1 −
64
2
c−22 . (9)
Parameterized individual endowments are
e1 = (1− e, e), e2 = (e, 1− e)
for the parameter e ∈ [0, 1]. We denote the endowment and consumption of agent h in
good l by ehl and chl, respectively. The price of good l is pl. Using the necessary and
sufficient first-order conditions for the agents’ utility maximization problems in addition to
the market-clearing equations yields the following equilibrium system, where λh denotes the
Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint of agent h,
64c−311 − λ1p1 = 0
c−312 − λ1p2 = 0
p1(c11 − e11) + p2(c12 − e12) = 0
c−321 − λ2p1 = 0
64c−322 − λ2p2 = 0
p1(c21 − e21) + p2(c22 − e22) = 0
c11 + c21 − e11 − e21 = 0
c12 + c22 − e12 − e22 = 0.
We transform this equilibrium system into a much simpler system of polynomial equations.
By Walras’ law we can normalize prices by setting p1 = 1 and eliminate the budget equation
of agent 2. This normalization allows us to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers and the first
optimality condition of each agent. Next, the market-clearing equation allows us to eliminate
the consumption variables of the second agent. And finally we substitute p2 = q3 and write
the remaining equations in terms of the excess demand xl = c1l − e1l of agent 1 to obtain
the following polynomial system.
(1− e+ x1)− 4(e+ x2)q = 0
4(e− x1)− (1− e− x2)q = 0
x1 + x2q3 = 0
The corresponding Singular code is as follows.
int n = 3;
ring R= (0,e),(x(1),x(2),q),lp;
option(redSB);
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ideal I =(
-4*(e+x(2))*q+(1-e+x(1)),
-(1-e-x(2))*q+4*(e-x(1)),
x(1)+x(2)*q**3);
ideal G=groebner(I);
The resulting Gro¨bner basis is as follows.
G[1]=(-15*e-1)*q**3+4*q**2-4*q+(15*e+1)
G[2]=(-225*e-15)*x(2)+(60*e+4)*q**2-16*q+(-225*e**2-30*e+15)
G[3]=15*x(1)+4*q+(-15*e-1)
The univariate representation has three roots,
1,
3− 15e−√5√1− 42e− 135e2
2(1 + 15e)
,
3− 15e+√5√1− 42e− 135e2
2(1 + 15e)
.
Figure 6 displays the real roots of G[1] for small values of e. For e ≤ 145 all three roots are
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Figure 6: Real roots of G[1] for small values of e
real and positive. The corresponding values for the excess demand variables, x1, x2, lead to
positive consumption values for both agents. Thus there are three Arrow-Debreu equilibria.
For e = 145 the polynomial G[1] has q = 1 as a triple root. For e >
1
45 two of three roots
are complex and so q = 1 remains as the unique Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Note that for
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positive values of e all leading terms are never zero and so the parameterized Gro¨bner basis
specializes correctly.
For our now following examination of strategic market games we focus on one particular
parameter value for which there are three equilibria. Table 1 reports the equilibrium values
for e = 151 ≈ 0.0196078.
q p2 x1 x2 c11 c12
0.740536 0.406105 -0.111202 0.273825 0.869190 0.293433
1 1 -0.180392 0.180392 0.8 0.2
1.35037 2.46241 -0.273825 0.111202 0.706567 0.13081
Table 1: Arrow-Debreu equilibria for e = 151
5.2 A Strategic Market Game
We consider a simple sell-all strategic market game in the spirit of Postlewaite and Schmei-
dler (1978). Here we summarize the computationally relevant aspects of the game. For
many additional details we refer the reader to the original paper.
Consider two types of agents with utility functions and endowments as specified in our
discussion of Arrow-Debreu equilibria. The so-called Nth replica of the economy consists
of N identical agents within each type. An individual is now characterized by his type
h = 1, 2 which determines his utility function and endowment as well as by his number in
the replica, m. Each individual i = (h,m) ∈ I has a strategy consisting of bids bi1 and
bi2 for commodities 1 and 2, respectively. (We consider a sell-all game and so sales are not
a choice variable. This fact simplifies the notation.) Prices are determined by supply and
demand as follows,
pl((bi)i∈I) =
∑
i∈I bil∑
i∈I eil
.
The budget constraints are
cil =
bil
pl((bj)j∈I)
, bi1 + bi2 = p1((bj)j∈I)ei1 + p2((bj)j∈I)ei2 .
We are interested in computing all symmetric Nash equilibria. (The problem of asymmetric
equilibria is another question that could also be addressed using our methods.) For the
specific example, with aggregate endowments in each good being N , we can rewrite the
budget constraint for agent i,
N(bi1 + bi2) = ei1
∑
j∈I
bj1 + ei2
∑
j∈I
bj2, (10)
cil = N
bil∑
j∈I bjl
. (11)
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In a symmetric Nash equilibrium we identify an agent simply by his type and, in a slight
abuse of notation, write bhl, h = 1, 2, for the bid of an agent of type h. With λ denoting
the Lagrange multiplier, the first order conditions for any agent of type 1 with respect to
bid l are then
k1l
(Nb2,l + (N − 1)b1,l)/(Nb1,l +Nb2,l)2
(b1,l/(Nb1l +Nb2l))
3 − λ(N − e1l ) = 0
where k11 = 64 and k12 = 1 are the respective weights in the utility functions of type 1
agents for consumption in goods 1 and 2, see (9). Eliminating the multiplier λ, we obtain
the following polynomial equation that characterizes optimal choices for agent 1,
64b312(N − e12)(Nb21 + (N − 1)b11)(b11 + b21)
= b311(N − e11)(Nb22 + (N − 1)b12)(b12 + b22) (12)
Budget equations (11) for h = 1, the optimality condition (12) for agents of type 1 and the
corresponding condition for agents of type 2 characterize symmetric Nash equilibria. These
are three polynomial equations in the four unknowns bhl for h = 1, 2 and l = 1, 2. To obtain
a square system of equations we need to normalize the bids. We add the equation
b11 + b12 + b21 + b22 = 10. (13)
The resulting system of equations still allows for a continuum of solutions, for example there
are continua with b11 = b21 = 0 or b11 = b22 = 0. So we need to add the condition that all
bids are different from zero. For this purpose we introduce the variable t and require as the
final equation that
1− tb11b21b12b22 = 0. (14)
In Singular we denote by b(1) and b(2) bids by agent 1 for goods 1 and 2 and by
b(3) and b(4) the bids of agent 2 for these two goods. We also include equations for the
consumption allocations of the two agents.
int m = 4;
ring R= (0,n),(t,c(1..m),b(1..m)),lp;
ideal I =(
64*(n-1/51)*(b(1)+b(3))*((n-1)*b(1)+n*b(3))*b(2)**3-(n-50/51)*
((n-1)*b(2)+n*b(4))*(b(2)+b(4))*b(1)**3,
1/64*(n-50/51)*(n*b(1)+(n-1)*b(3))*(b(1)+b(3))*b(4)**3-(n-1/51)*(b(2)+b(4))*
((n-1)*b(4)+n*b(2))*b(3)**3,
1/51*b(1)+50/51*b(2)-50/51*b(3)-1/51*b(4),
10-b(1)-b(2)-b(3)-b(4),
1-t*b(1)*b(2)*b(3)*b(4),
c(1)*(b(1)+b(3))-b(1),
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c(2)*(b(2)+b(4))-b(2),
c(3)*(b(1)+b(3))-b(3),
c(4)*(b(2)+b(4))-b(4));
ideal G=groebner(I);
The resulting expression for the univariate representation is rather messy and so we do
not display it here. We can find all roots of G[1] as a function of the parameter n. For
n = 1 there is a unique positive solution corresponding to a unique Nash equilibrium. For
n > 1 there are 3 solutions corresponding to three symmetric Nash equilibria. Table 2
reports agent 1’s equilibrium consumption for a few selected values of n. We observe that
N c1(1) c2(1) c1(2) c2(2) c1(3) c2(3)
1 0.882646 0.117354 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 0.812542 0.187458 0.868703 0.259155 0.740845 0.131297
10 0.801999 0.198001 0.875683 0.299961 0.700039 0.124317
100 0.800193 0.199807 0.869945 0.294277 0.705723 0.130055
1000 0.800019 0.199981 0.869267 0.293519 0.706481 0.130733
WE 0.8 0.2 0.869190 0.293433 0.706567 0.130810
Table 2: Equilibria for various values of N
the three Nash equilibria converge to the three Walrasian equilibria of the corresponding
Arrow-Debreu economy.
6 Multiple Steady States in OLG Models
Overlapping generations (“OLG”) models are a workhorse for both theoretical and applied
analysis in economics, particularly in public finance, monetary theory and macroeconomics.
Robust examples of OLG economies with a continuum of competitive equilibria are well
known in the economics literature. For example, Kehoe and Levine (1990) construct robust
examples of realistically calibrated OLG models with agents living for three periods in which
indeterminacy of equilibria occurs. They point out that the possibility of a continuum of
competitive equilibria poses a serious challenge to applied equilibrium modeling in the spirit
of the influential work by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). As one possible escape from
the indeterminacy of equilibria, Kehoe and Levine (1990) suggest to focus on stationary
equilibria (steady states). Kehoe and Levine (1984) show that steady states are generally
determinate. Clearly the presence of multiple (albeit finitely many) steady states also poses
problems to the application of OLG models in policy analysis. Unfortunately conditions that
ensure uniqueness of steady states are extremely restrictive, see Kehoe et al. (1991). Beyond
these conditions little if anything is known about multiplicity of steady state equilibria in
25
OLG models. In the following we show how Gro¨bner bases methods can address this
important problem.
6.1 A Stationary OLG Model
We consider the so-called “double-ended infinity model” (Kehoe et al. (1991), Geanako-
plos (2008)) in which discrete time runs from minus infinity to plus infinity, t ∈ Z =
{. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. At each time t a representative agent is born and lives for N ≥ 2
periods. Each period those agents who are alive receive an endowment ea that depends
solely on their age, a = 1, . . . , N . An agent’s utility is time separable with the utility of an
agent born at time t given by
Ut(c) =
N∑
a=1
u(ca(t+ a− 1)),
where ca(t+ a− 1) denotes the consumption of an agent born at time t in period t+ a− 1
(when he is in period a of his life). For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume
that agents do not discount and have time-invariant utility. The computational methods
also apply to more general models.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as usual by market clearing and agent optimality,
that is, it is given by a sequence of prices and consumption allocations,(
p(t), (c¯a(t))Na=1
)
t∈Z
such that for each t,
N∑
a=1
(c¯a(t)− ea) = 0
and
(c¯1(t), . . . , c¯N (t+N − 1)) ∈ argmaxc(t),...,c(t+N−1) Ut(c(t), . . . , c(t+N − 1))
subject to
N∑
a=1
p(t+ a− 1) (c(t+ a− 1)− ea) = 0.
The computation of a general competitive equilibrium requires us to calculate infinitely
many prices and consumption values. Clearly our methods cannot compute arbitrary non-
stationary equilibria. But they allow us to find all stationary equilibria.
A steady state, or stationary equilibrium, is a collection of consumption allocations for
all agents and all ages as well as prices such that market clearing and agent optimality holds
and for all t ∈ Z,
pt+1
pt
= q > 0 and c¯a(t) = ca .
There are two types of such stationary equilibria. Kehoe and Levine (1984) prove that
(generically) q = 1 corresponds to the unique “monetary” steady state and that there is an
odd number of “real” (non-monetary) steady states with q 6= 1.
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This completes our concise description of steady states in our stationary OLG pure
exchange economy. For much more detailed treatments of OLG economies we refer the
interested reader to Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) and Geanakoplos (2008). These treat-
ments relate our model to the classic OLG model of Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973) with
fiat money.
6.2 Polynomial Equilibrium System
In applied research modelers often assume that agents’ per period utility function is given by
u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ for 0 < σ 6= 1 (and log utility for σ = 1). For σ ∈ N this utility function leads to
polynomial equilibrium equations. Using the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions
for agents’ utility maximization problems in addition to the market-clearing equations yields
the following equilibrium system,
cσa+1q − cσa = 0, a = 1, . . . , N − 1,
N∑
a=1
qa−1(ca − ea) = 0,
N∑
a=1
(ca − ea) = 0.
Evidently the system always has a solution with q = 1 and ca = 1N
∑N
a=1 ea. This solution is
the unique monetary steady state. It is called the “golden rule” steady state and is Pareto
efficient.
We now investigate the number of real steady states in this economy. For the purpose
of finding all equilibria with Singular we define w = q1/σ and rewrite the system of
equilibrium equations as follows,
ca+1w − ca = 0, a = 1, . . . , N − 1,
N∑
a=1
wσ(a−1)(ca − ea) = 0,
N∑
a=1
ca − ea = 0.
For integer-valued σ this system is polynomial. We do not examine the case of log utility
since it is well-known that there is a unique real steady state, see Kehoe et al. (1991).
Instead we begin our analysis with σ = 2 and subsequently examine larger levels of risk
aversion. To give the reader some idea about the needed Singular code and the resulting
output we show the code and output for N = 3 and σ = 2. As in Section 5.1 we use excess
demand variables x(a) for ca−ea. We denote the endowment parameters e1, e2, e3 by e, f, g,
respectively.
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int n = 4;
ring R= (0,e,f,g,b),x(1..n),lp;
option(redSB);
ideal I =(
-(f+x(2))*x(4)+(e+x(1)),
-(g+x(3))*x(4)+(f+x(2)),
x(1)+x(2)*x(4)**2+x(3)*x(4)**4,
x(1)+x(2)+x(3));
ideal G=groebner(I);
The resulting Gro¨bner basis is as follows.
G[1]=(-g)*x(4)**4+(e+g)*x(4)**2+(-e)
G[2]=(3*e**2+3*e*g+3*g**2)*x(3)+(-e**2*g-e*f*g-3*e*g**2-2*f*g**2-2*g**3)*
x(4)**3+(2*e**2*g+2*e*f*g+3*e*g**2+f*g**2+g**3)*x(4)**2+(e**3+e**2*f+
3*e**2*g+2*e*f*g+5*e*g**2+3*f*g**2+3*g**3)*x(4)+(-2*e**3-2*e**2*f-
3*e**2*g-4*e*f*g-4*e*g**2-3*f*g**2)
G[3]=(-3*e**2-3*e*g-3*g**2)*x(2)+(-2*e**2*g-2*e*f*g-3*e*g**2-f*g**2-g**3)*
x(4)**3+(e**2*g+e*f*g-f*g**2-g**3)*x(4)**2+(2*e**3+2*e**2*f+6*e**2*g+
4*e*f*g+7*e*g**2+3*f*g**2+3*g**3)*x(4)+(-e**3-4*e**2*f-3*e**2*g-
5*e*f*g-2*e*g**2-3*f*g**2)
G[4]=(-3*e**2-3*e*g-3*g**2)*x(1)+(e**2*g+e*f*g-f*g**2-g**3)*x(4)**3+(e**2*g
+e*f*g+3*e*g**2+2*f*g**2+2*g**3)*x(4)**2+(-e**3-e**2*f-3*e**2*g-
2*e*f*g-2*e*g**2)*x(4)+(-e**3+2*e**2*f+e*f*g-2*e*g**2)
The Shape Lemma holds and the univariate representation G[1] provides us with an
equation for the possible equilibrium values of w. Note that for positive values of the pa-
rameters all leading terms are never zero and so the parameterized Gro¨bner basis specializes
correctly.
6.3 Uniqueness for σ = 2
Singular computes the fully parameterized Gro¨bner basis in a few seconds for N =
3, 4, 5, 6, in a few minutes for N = 7, 8, and in about an hour for N = 9, 10. When N
is even, the univariate representation is given by
r(w) =
N∑
i=1
eiw
2(i−1) −
(
N∑
i=1
ei
)
wN−1.
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Eq w c1 c2 c3
1 0.479331 1.81485 3.78621 7.89894
2 0.775522 3.41586 4.40460 5.67953
3 1 4.5 4.5 4.5
4 3.98751 10.2765 2.57718 0.646312
Table 3: Steady States for e2 = 12
For odd N the expression is
r(w) =
(N−1)/2∑
i=1
eiw
2(i−1) −
(N−1)/2∑
i=1
ei +
N∑
i=(N+3)/2
ei
wN−1 + N∑
i=(N+3)/2
eiw
2(i−1).
Observe that in both cases there are exactly two sign changes among the coefficients. Thus,
Descartes’ Rule bounds the number of positive real solutions by two. But we know that
there must be at least two solutions. The golden rule monetary steady state is given by the
solution w = 1. The remaining solution thus must be the only real steady state. To the
best of our knowledge, this result was not previously known. In sum, direct Gro¨bner basis
computation proves the following result.
Proposition 1 The double-ended infinity exchange economy with σ = 2 has a unique real
steady state for all N .
Applied researchers may consider a value of σ = 2 to be somewhat realistic for the calibra-
tions of models. The proposition implies for the double-ended infinity model that researchers
do not need to worry about multiplicity of real steady states for σ = 2. We next show that
for integer-valued σ ≥ 3 multiplicity of real steady states arises.
6.4 Larger Coefficients of Risk Aversion
For σ = 3 and N = 3 the univariate representation is given by
r(w) = e3w6 − (e1 + e2 + e3)w4 + (e1 + 2e2 + e3)w3 − (e1 + e2 + e3)w2 + e1.
There are four sign changes and so Descartes’ rule no longer guarantees the existence of a
unique non-monetary steady state. In fact, it is a simple exercise to construct economies
with four equilibria, that is one monetary and three real (non-monetary) steady states.
Figure 7 shows the positive real roots of the univariate representation r as a function of
e2 for e1 = 1 and e3 = 12 . For e2 < 10.575747 there is a unique real steady state in
addition to the monetary steady state (w = 1). For e2 > 10.575747 the polynomial r has
four positive real roots. All four solutions for w lead to positive consumption values for the
N = 3 agents alive at any given time. Table 3 lists all four steady states for e2 = 12. The
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Figure 7: Equilibria for e1 = 1 and e3 = 12
first two steady states are efficient equilibria with positive interest rates, the third steady
state is the monetary steady state with a zero interest rate, and the fourth steady state
is inefficient with a negative interest rate. Similar to the examples of indeterminacy of
equilibria in Kehoe and Levine (1990) the existence of multiple real steady states requires
substantial hump-shape in life-cycle income.
For σ = 3, unlike for the case of σ = 2, the number of sign changes in the univariate
representation is no longer independent of N . For example, for N = 5 (and σ = 3) we ob-
tain a univariate representation with 6 sign changes. Denoting the endowment parameters
e1, e2, . . . , e5 by e, f, g, h, i, respectively, the polynomial G[1] is as follows.
G[1]=(-i)*x(6)**12+(-h)*x(6)**9+(e+f+g+h+i)*x(6)**8+(-e-f-g-h-i)*x(6)**7+
(e+f+h+i)*x(6)**6+(-e-f-g-h-i)*x(6)**5+(e+f+g+h+i)*x(6)**4+
(-f)*x(6)**3+(-e)
There are six sign changes and so there could be up to six positive real solutions and
thus up to five real steady states in this economy.
Our last example of OLG economies outlines how we can apply the described methods
to models used in applied work. Krueger and Kubler (2005) calibrate a nine-period OLG
model to match observed US data. While they consider a stochastic model with capital
accumulation and shocks to production, we can still use the labor income from their calibra-
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age a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
la 1 1.35 1.54 1.65 1.67 1.66 1.61 1/3 1/3
Table 4: Labor Endowments
tion as individual endowments since the calibration of life-cycle income is from income data.
Figure 4 lists these endowments. For these endowments and σ = 3 the polynomial system
of our double-ended infinity model has four real solutions. Two of them are not equilibria
since prices are negative. Equilibrium consumption in the unique real steady state is
(2.10122, 1.80705, 1.55407, 1.33651, 1.1494, 0.988487, 0.850102, 0.73109, 0.62874)
and the interest rate is 1
1.162793
− 1. The interest rate is negative and thus the equilibrium
is inefficient. (We also computed equilibria for σ = 4 and σ = 5 and the real steady state
remains unique.)
Clearly the analysis of a realistically calibrated applied model is greatly aided by the
existence of a unique steady state. Although Kehoe and Levine (1990) demonstrate that it
is straightforward to construct fairly realistic examples with multiple steady states, many
applied modelers hope (or even claim) that their computed (real) steady states are unique.
Of course, it remains an open question for many policy models whether computed real
steady states in fact are unique. The Gro¨bner basis methods offer one possible approach to
examine this issue in much detail.
7 Conclusion
Multiplicity of equilibria is a prevalent problem in many economic models. Often equilibria
are characterized as solutions to a system of polynomial equations. Therefore, methods that
allow the computation of all solutions to such systems are of great interest to economists.
In this paper we have provided an introduction to the application of Gro¨bner basis
methods for finding all solutions to polynomial systems of equations. We have described
a beautiful result from algebraic geometry, the Shape Lemma, which states under mild
assumptions that a given polynomial system is equivalent to a much simpler system with
identical solutions. The new system enables a fast and robust calculation of all solutions.
Essentially the computation of all solutions reduces to finding all roots of a single polynomial
in a single unknown. We have described the software package Singular which computes
the equivalent simple system. If all coefficients in the original equilibrium equations are
rational numbers or parameters then the computations of Singular are exact. This fact
implies that the described methods cannot only be used for a numerical approximation of
equilibria but in fact may allow us to prove theoretical results for the underlying economic
model. Three economic applications have illustrated that without much prior knowledge
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in algebraic geometry the described methods can be used to gain interesting insights into
modern economic models.
In a companion paper (Kubler and Schmedders, 2007) we prove that for large classes
of general equilibrium models the assumption of semi-algebraic marginal utility leads to
polynomial equilibrium equations. We show that the Shape Lemma can be applied to a
wide variety of GE models and thereby build the theoretical foundation for a systematic
analysis of multiplicity in applied general equilibrium.
Appendix
A Mathematical Background
Section 2 of this paper contains a brief summary of definitions and concepts from the
mathematical field of algebraic geometry that are important for a basic understanding of
the presented Gro¨bner basis methods. In this Appendix we provide additional mathematical
details. And once again we refer the interested reader to the textbooks by Cox et al. (1997,
1998) for an excellent introduction to computational algebraic geometry.
A.1 Ideals and Varieties
A subset I of the polynomial ring K[x] is called an ideal if 0 ∈ I, I is closed under sums,
f + g ∈ I for all f, g ∈ I, and it satisfies the property that h · f ∈ I for all f ∈ I and
h ∈ K[x]. It is easy to check that for given polynomials f1, . . . , fk, the set
I = {
k∑
i=1
hifi : hi ∈ K[x]} = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉
is in fact an ideal (as stated in Section 2). It is called the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fk.
The polynomials f1, . . . , fk are called a basis of I. This ideal 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 is the set of all
linear combinations of the polynomials f1, . . . , fk, where the ‘coefficients’ in each linear
combination are themselves polynomials in the polynomial ring K[x]. The famous Hilbert
Basis Theorem states that for any ideal I ⊂ K[x] there exist finitely many polynomials that
generate I. Note that K[x] is itself an ideal, a basis being the constant polynomials f = 1.
The intersection of two ideals I and J is the set of polynomials that belong both to I and
J . The intersection is an ideal itself, as is easy to check. The product of two ideals I and
J , IJ , can be defined as the set of polynomials h = fg with f ∈ I and g ∈ J .
For an ideal I we denote by V (I) the affine variety of I, the set of points where all the
elements of I vanish. If I = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 then we can simply write V (I) = {y ∈ Kn : f1(y) =
. . . = fk(y) = 0}. Independently of the field K, we refer to the complex variety of an ideal
as
VC(I) = {y ∈ Cn : f1(y) = . . . = fk(y) = 0}.
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If I and J are ideals in K[x], then V (IJ) = V (I) ∪ V (J).
The Hilbert Basis Theorem implies that any affine variety in Kn is the set of all solutions
of a system of finitely many polynomial equations. We write V (f1, . . . , fn) to denote the
set of solutions to f1(x) = . . . = fn(x) = 0. If f1, . . . , fs and g1, . . . , gt are bases of the same
ideal in K[x] then V (f1, . . . , fs) = V (g1, . . . , gt). This relatively obvious observation is the
starting point of our method to solve polynomial equations: For a given polynomial system,
examine the ideal that is generated by the system and ask if there is another basis for this
ideal which is simple in the sense that we can easily find all elements of the complex variety.
Before stating the main result, we need to introduce a few more concepts. An ideal I is
called zero-dimensional if its complex variety contains finitely many points. For an ideal I
the radical of I is defined as
√
I = {f ∈ K[x] : ∃m ≥ 1 such that fm ∈ I}. The radical √I
is itself an ideal and contains I, I ⊂ √I. We call an ideal I radical if I = √I.
The ‘strong Nullstellensatz’ is the main reason why it is useful for us to focus on zero-
dimensional radical ideals. It states that if the field K is algebraically closed (that is, in
our framework, if K = C), then I(V (I)) =
√
I = I. So, radical ideals are in one-to-
one correspondence with complex varieties. This fact is not true for the computationally
convenient case of K = Q, but we see below that this issue is of no consequence for our
analysis.
How can we check if a given ideal is radical and zero-dimensional? Given a polynomial
function f : Cn → C partial derivatives with respect to complex numbers are defined in the
usual way. Write
f = c0(x−j) + c1(x−j)xj + . . .+ cd(x−j)xdj ,
where the ci are polynomials in the variables x−j = (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn). Then,
∂f
∂xj
:= c1(x−j) + . . .+ dcd(x−j)xd−1j .
Given a system of polynomial equations f : Cn → Cn, the Jacobian ∂xf(x) is defined as
usual as the matrix of partial derivatives. A sufficient condition for an ideal 〈f1, . . . , fn〉
to be radical and zero-dimensional is that det(∂x(f1(x), . . . , fn(x))) 6= 0 whenever f1(x) =
. . . = fn(x) = 0. See Cox et al. (1998, Chapter 4.2).
A.2 Gro¨bner Basis
A crucial element for the analysis of families of polynomials is the presence of an order
among the monomials appearing within a polynomial. Throughout this paper we order
monomials according to the lexicographic ordering, that is,
xα > xβ ⇐⇒ α > β ⇐⇒ The left-most non-zero entry of α− β is positive.
For this particular monomial order we can define for any polynomial f ∈ K[x] the multide-
gree of f =
∑
α aαx
α, md(f) = max{α ∈ Zn+ : aα 6= 0}. That is, the multidegree of f is
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the largest vector of exponents among the monomials in f according to the monomial (here
lexicographic) ordering. The monomial with the multidegree as its vector of exponents gives
rise to the leading term of f , LT(f) = amd(f)x
mdf . We will see below that the leading
term plays a prominent role in Buchberger’s algorithm for finding Gro¨bner Bases.
We denote by LT (I) the set of leading terms of elements of I, that is, LT (I) = {cxα :
∃f ∈ I with LT (f) = cxα} and by 〈LT (I)〉 the ideal generated by all the elements of
LT (I). Note that if I = 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 then it is true that 〈LT (f1), . . . , LT (fk)〉 ⊂ 〈LT (I)〉
but the converse often does not hold. To see this, consider the example f1 = x3 − 2xy,
f2 = x2y − 2y2 + x. A quick check shows that x2 ∈ I = 〈f1, f2〉. So x2 must be in LT (I).
But clearly x2 is not an element of 〈LT (f1), LT (f2)〉.
The question is if there are some polynomials g1, . . . , gk which generate I and for which
in fact 〈LT (g1), . . . , LT (gk)〉 = 〈LT (I)〉. In fact, such polynomials exist and they are called
a Gro¨bner basis for I. For now it is not so clear why this should be interesting. That should
become clear in the next section. The formal definition of a Gro¨bner bases allows us to
understand the algorithm to compute one.
Definition 1 A finite subset g1, . . . , gs of an ideal I is called a Gro¨bner basis of I if
〈LT (g1), . . . , LT (gk)〉 = 〈LT (I)〉.
While the definition does not require that g1, . . . , gk form a basis for I this fact can be
shown fairly easily.
A Gro¨bner basis, G, is called ‘reduced’ if for all distinct p, q ∈ G no monomial appearing
in p is a multiple of LT (q). Each ideal in K[x1, . . . , xn] has a unique reduced Gro¨bner basis
in which the coefficient of the leading term of every polynomial is one.
(Lexicographic) Gro¨bner bases are interesting because, under some fairly mild technical
conditions, they reduce the problem of finding all solutions of a square polynomial system
of equations to finding all zeros of a single univariate polynomial. Before discussing this
result we first describe an algorithm to compute Gro¨bner bases.
A.3 Buchberger’s Algorithm
There are now a variety of methods to compute Gro¨bner bases. The original algorithm by
Buchberger implies a constructive existence proof for Gro¨bner basis and allows us to derive
some important properties. Therefore we briefly outline the algorithm. In order to do so,
we first need to generalize the division of two polynomials in one variable to multivariate
polynomials.
Given any polynomials f1, . . . , fs ∈ K[x], with md(fi) ≥ md(fi+1), we can write every
f ∈ K in the form
f = a1f1 + . . .+ asfs + r,
where ai, r ∈ K[x] and either r = 0 or r is a linear combinations of monomials, none of
which is divisible by any of the leading terms LT (f1), . . . , LT (fs). The polynomial r is
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called the remainder of f on division by f1, . . . , fs. Furthermore if aifi 6= 0 we must have
that md(f) ≥ md(aifi).
A formal algorithm which computes a1, . . . , as and r given any polynomials f, f1, . . . , fs
is described in Cox et al. (1997, Chapter 2.3). The algorithm can be implemented exactly
(that is, performing computations without numerical errors) if K = Q. While the algebra
behind the division algorithm is very simple, the algorithm plays a crucial role in the
computation of Gro¨bner bases.
To outline Buchberger’s algorithm for the computation of a Gro¨bner basis, we need to
define an S-polynomial. Let f, g ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] with md(f) = α and md(g) = β. Define
γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) by γi = max{αi, βi}, i = 1, . . . n, and define
S(f, g) =
xγ
LT (f)
f − x
γ
LT (g)
g .
The S-polynomial is interesting because of the following result.
Theorem 1 G is a Gro¨bner basis if and only if for each gi, gj ∈ G, the remainder of S(gi, gj)
on division by G is zero.
For a proof of this theorem see Cox et al (1997, Chapter 2.6).
Given this result, it is possible to prove that the following algorithm always produces a
Gro¨bner basis in finitely many steps. Let F = {f1, . . . , fk} be a basis for the ideal I. We
construct a set G which is a Gro¨bner basis.
1. Set G := F .
2. G′ := G.
3. For each pair p, q ∈ G′, p 6= q, let S denote the remainder of S(f, g) on division by
G′. If S 6= 0 then G := G ∪ {S}.
4. If G 6= G′ goto step 2.
To prove that the algorithm works, first we show that in each iteration 〈G〉, i.e. the ideal
generated by all polynomials in the finite set G is a subset of I. If the algorithm termi-
nates, the resulting G must be a Gro¨bner basis by the above theorem. It is a bit more
involved to show that the algorithm actually does terminate: in each iteration, we must
have 〈LT (G′)〉 ⊂ 〈LT (G)〉 since G′ ⊂ G. If G′ 6= G, the inclusion is strict. The following
lemma then implies that eventually the inclusion cannot be strict, G′ = G and the algorithm
must stop at a finite number of iterations.
Lemma 3 (Ascending Chains Lemma) Let I1 ⊂ I2 ⊂ . . . be an ascending chain of ideals
in K[x1, . . . , xn]. Then there exists a N ≥ 1 such that IN = IN+1 = IN+2 = . . . ...
35
To prove the lemma, consider the set I = ∪∞i=1Ii. Note that I is an ideal. By the
Hilbert basis theorem, I must be finitely generated, i.e., there must exist f1, . . . , fs such
that I = 〈f1, . . . , fs〉, but each of the generators must be contained is some of the Ij , take
n to be the maximum of these j′s.
Note that while this algorithm is well defined independently of the field K, it can be
performed exactly over Q. Furthermore, if the coefficients in the polynomials f1, . . . , fk are
parameters, the algorithm can be applied to obtain a set of polynomials g1, . . . , gm whose
coefficients themselves are polynomial functions of the parameters. If the coefficients of
f1, . . . , fk are real parameters, the coefficients of g1, . . . , gm will be polynomial functions in
these parameters, with rational coefficients. The result of Buchberger’s algorithm forms a
Gro¨bner basis for 〈f1, . . . , fk〉 for all values of the parameters, except for a set that is a
finite union of sets defined by polynomial equations. The division set is generic in that for
specific values of the parameters (satisfying some polynomial equation) it implies division
by zero and is therefore not valid. However, if we take the parameters to lie in Rk, the
polynomials resulting from Buchberger’s algorithm for a Gro¨bner basis for a Zariski-open
subset of Rk. Unless some of the polynomial functions are identical equal to zero (and the
subset of valid parameters is the empty set), the set of parameters for which the resulting
functions do not form a Gro¨bner basis has k-dimensional Lebesgue measure zero. This does
not change if one considers a reduced Gro¨bner basis. In this case, one simply eliminates
some of the generating polynomials.
So called ‘comprehensive’ Gro¨bner bases keep track of all sub-cases, including the non-
generic ones, but we argue below that they are not needed in the multiplicity analysis.
A.4 Elimination Ideals and the Shape Lemma
For given I = 〈f1, . . . , fs〉 ⊂ K[x1, . . . , xn], define the l’th elimination ideal Il as the ideal
in K[xl+1, . . . , xn] defined by Il = I ∩ k[xl+1, . . . , xn]. In other words Il consists of all
‘consequences’ of f1 = . . . = fs = 0 which eliminate the variables x1, . . . , xl. Each Il is an
ideal, i.e. there exist polynomials f1, . . . , fr ∈ K[xl+1, . . . , xn] that generate Il. If I is radical
and zero-dimensional then the (n− 1)th elimination ideal must describe the xn-coordinate
of all possible solutions to the original system solutions. Since there are finitely many there
must be a univariate polynomial that generates this (at least, if we take K = C, this is
just the product of all (xn − ai) terms for all zeros ai). By the strong Nullstellensatz, this
polynomial must itself belong to the ideal (since adding it to the ideal does not change the
solution set).
Given a set of polynomials G = {f1, . . . , fr} we can obviously define G∩K[xl+1, . . . , xn]
as those polynomials in G which only involve xl+1, . . . , xn. For general polynomials and
l > 0 this set will generally be empty. However, not for Gro¨bner bases, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 2 (Elimination Theorem) Let I ⊂ K[x1, . . . , xn] be an ideal and let G be a lex
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Gro¨bner basis of I. Then for every 0 ≤ l ≤ n, Gl = G ∩K[xl+1, . . . , xn] is a Gro¨bner basis of
the l’th elimination ideal.
Proof. For l between 0 and n − 1, since Gl ⊂ Il by construction, it suffices to show that
〈LT (Il)〉 = 〈LT (Gl)〉. It suffices to show that in fact 〈LT (Il)〉 ⊂ 〈LT (Gl)〉. In other words,
for every f ∈ Il, LT (f) is divisible by LT (g) for some g ∈ Gl. Note that f must also lie
in I which means that LT (f) must be divisible by some LT (g), g ∈ G. But since f ∈ Il
this means that LT (G) can only involve variables xl+1, . . . , xn. But since we work under
lex order, LT (g) ∈ K[xl+1, . . . , xn] must imply that g ∈ K[xl+1, . . . , xs]. ¤
This result now leads us to the Shape Lemma. Given a zero-dimensional radical ideal I,
with V (I) = {a1, . . . , ad}, the above theorem implies that the reduced lexicographic Gro¨bner
basis of I must contain the univariate polynomial Πdi=1(xn−ain), which must be a polynomial
over K. If across all i = 1, . . . , d, the ain are distinct, for each l = 1, . . . , n − 1, ail must be
the unique solution to a polynomial involving only xl, . . . , xn with xl+1 = ail+1, . . . , xn = a
i
n.
But for K = C this implies that this polynomial must be linear in xl (otherwise it has more
than one solution, the ideal being radical rules out multiple zeros). The Shape Lemma form
than simply follows by substituting recursively for each xl, l = 2, . . . , n− 1.
A.5 The Parametric Shape Lemma
For e ∈ E, let fe = (f1(e, ·), . . . , fn(e, ·)) be a system of polynomial equations in parameters,
e, and in the unknowns (x1, . . . , xn). Let ge = (g1(e, ·), . . . , gn(e, ·)) denote the output of
Buchberger’s algorithm. The parametric shape lemma requires that for all e ∈ E, the
original system f is regular. If this is the case, ge is the correct reduced Gro¨bner basis
and has the Shape-Lemma form for ’generic’ e¯, that is for all e¯ ∈ E outside of a closed
set of Lebesgue measure zero (see e.g. Cox et al. (1997) for this result). We obtain a
slightly stronger result in that we characterize the set of parameters for which the output
of Buchberger’s algorithm is not the correct Gro¨bner basis explicitly.
By the implicit function theorem, regularity of f guarantees that for all e¯, for any x¯ that
is among the finitely many solutions to f(x) = 0, there is an open neighborhood around
e¯ such that for all sequences of parameters (ei) in this neighborhood that converge to e¯,
there exist (xi) such that for all i, f(ei, xi) = 0 and xi → x¯. Therefore if f(e¯, x¯) = 0, we
must also have g(e¯, x¯) = 0. This is true because we can find sequences of parameters which
converge to e¯ and for which g is the correct Gro¨bner basis at all points along the sequence.
However, in principle it can be the case that g(e¯, x) = 0 has solutions that are not
solutions to the original system. One simple way to rule this out is to require that g itself
is regular at e¯. Rather than assuming this, one can actually verify this. A singularity can
only occur if either a derivative with respect to x1, . . . , xn−1 is equal to zero, which means
that some ρl(e¯) = 0, l = 1, . . . , n − 1 or that r(e¯, x) = 0 and ∂r/∂x = 0. If r(e¯, ·) is not
identically equal to zero, the latter implies that there is a multiple solution which is ruled
37
out by regularity of fe¯.
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